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ABSTRACT 
The paper introduces a new systematic assessment conceptual framework to evaluate 
Scottish devolution. In doing so it draws from various strands of literature including 
public policy, constitutional and territorial politics. It utilizes Ȃȱ (2010) 
framework and distinguish between process, programmatic and political success. It 
explores the various dimensions of the policy of devolution, highlighting that 
devolution is viewed as a success by both unionists and non-unionists with both 
working within the existing settlement as well as projecting alternative Scottish 
constitutional futures. This success may be transient and vulnerable for each sowing 
the seeds of potential failure as both view devolution as successful for different 
reasons. For both it has provided a platform for increasing Scottish self-governance. 
For unionists this process strengthens the union, while for non-unionists it sows the 
seeds for increasing autonomous and independent government.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
The advent in 1999 of the Scottish Parliament was the most fundamental 
constitutional change in the governing of Scotland for almost three hundred 
years. It was a recognition of the failure of a unitary form of unionism, 
advocated among others by Conservative governments at Westminster 
during the period 1979-1997, to satisfy political and civic demands for greater 
autonomy in the governance of Scotland (see Brown et al 1998; Finlay 2008; 
McGarvey and Cairney 2008; Mitchell, 2009; Keating 2010).  
The old UK constitutional arrangement was failing in Scotland with 
government legitimacy increasingly questioned in the 1980s and 1990s. 
ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȁȱ limit on the absolute sovereignty of the 
Westminster parliament, thus there was no need to consider Scottish 
distinctivenessȂ (Devine 2006: 606), whereas previously there had been an 
acceptance in both Conservative and Labour circles that Scotland should be 
accommodated within the union (Denver et al 2000: 13). The Conservative 
Party in Government combined a Thatcherite hard line unitary form of 
unionism, then a combination of exposition an exposition ȱ ȱ ȁȱ
Ȃȱȱȱȱa ȁȱȱȁȱ¡ǰȱ ȱȱȱsome 
minor procedural tinkering. All of which failed to halt demands for home 
rule, which grew throughout the 1980s and 1990s. These aspirations were 
legitimated and popularised by the Scottish Constitutional Convention (1987-
1995).  
These demands were met following the election of the Blair Government in 
1997. Scottish devolution was implemented remarkably smoothly (and 
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speedily). The Blair Government held a referendum in Autumn 1997, which 
overwhelmingly endorsed the proposals. The passage of the Scotland Act 
through Westminster proved straightforward Ȯ the first Scottish 
parliamentary elections were held in May 1999 and the Scottish Parliament 
convened (or reconvened, depending on your perspective) on 1 July 1999.  
Post-devolution, the momentum in favour of some adjustment to the existing 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ¢ȱȱ
victory in 2007. ȱ 	¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ǰȱ ȁȱ ȱ ȱ
settlement no longer appears (in the late ȱȂȱ-ȱǼǰȱ ȁȱ
ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȂȱ ǻŘŖŖŞǱȱŘśśǼǯȱThe pro-Unionists established 
the Commission on Scottish Devolution in 2008; its report (Calman 
Commission, 2009) provided the basis for further transfers of power to the 
Scottish Parliament via the Scotland Bill.  The Calman Report has been 
marshalled by pro-unionist forces as evidence that devolution was a more 
flexible form of Unionism that has succeeded where unitary Unionism had 
failed.  However, following the landslide 2011 Scottish Parliamentary election 
victory by the SNP, its recommended adjustment to the 1999 devolution 
settlement appears conservative.  
However, despite the SNP 2011 election success, opinion polls have 
consistently shown only minority support for Scottish independence (see 
table 1 below). The 2007 SNP minority Scottish Government-initiated 
'National Ȃ was the vehicle for galvanising a counter-devolution 
movement. It culminated in a White Paper Your Scotland, Your Voice (Scottish 
Government, 2009) that formed the basis for a draft bill seeking to initiate a 
referendum. It included Scottish independence as one option in a multi-
option referendum on the future governance of Scotland.  
 
Table 1: Constitutional Preferences in Scotland 1997 Ȯ 2009 
 
Year  Independence % Devolution % No Parliament % 
1997  37   41   17  
1999  28   58   10 
2000  30   55   12 
2001  27   60   9 
2002  30   52   12 
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2003  26   55   13  
2004  32   45   17 
2005  35   44   14  
2006  30   54   9 
2007  24   62   9 
2009  28   56   8 
 
Ǳȱ¢ǰȱ ǯȱǱȱ ȱƽȱ ȁȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ
UK and EU or separate from UK but part of EU, devolution = Scotland should remain part of 
UK with own parliament with some or no taxation powers, No parliament = Scotland should 
remain part of the UK without an elected Parliament.  
 
This paper asks the simple question, has devolution been a policy success? In 
seeking to answer it should be acknowledged that success means different 
things for different political interests, it is Ȯ to a degree Ȯ a constructed term. 
ȁȂȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱ ǰȱ ȁȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȁȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ
Ȃǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ¢ȱ  policy can be wide and 
varied and usually contain varying degrees of shortfall and ambiguity. 
Different political interests tend to latch on to whichever of these suits in 
order to justify success (or failure), depending on whether it suits their 
underlying support (or opposition) to the policy.  
We would suggest there are three key coalitions of interest with regard to 
Scottish devolution Ȯ UK unionist, Scottish unionist and Scottish non-
unionist. This partially follows Keating (2009: 117) in suggesting that 
devolution has led to the redrawing of the constitutional fault lines in Scottish 
politics, marking the division between two broad camps. The old pre-
devolution three-way division of Scottish politics Ȯ independence, devolution 
and centralisation has been reduced to two. One is a coalition of pro-Union 
supporters of devolution (mainly the Labour, Liberal Democrat and 
Conservative parties), coalescing around the view that Scottish devolution 
has succeeded in strengthening the Union.  The previous Conservative hard-
line non-devolved unionism has no credibility, and all parties in this camp 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ Ȃȱ
(Deacon and Sandry 2007: 97) in order to successfully challenge the SNP 
Unionists see devolution as a pragmatic response and accommodation to 
distinct territorial interests within the union. A second camp comprises anti-
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Union nationalists (primarily the Scottish National Party), perceiving Scottish 
devolution ultimately as a stepping-stone towards independence. From a 
nationalist perspective, Scottish devolution was designed as a sop to their 
independence policy that challenged the territorial integrity of the UK. 
However, they recognise that it does provide a platform for further increases 
in governing autonomy.  
There are two points of convergence in all three camps. First, both agree that 
devolution was, in a sense, a response to policy failure Ȯ the old constitutional 
settlement was not working. Second, there is a general consensus between 
both that devolution has worked.  
The success of devolution is a theme shared in various academic and political 
retrospectives that have been written. For example, Mitchell (2009) refers to it 
ȱ ȱ ȁȱ Ȃȱ  ȱ ȁ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ȃǯȱ The 
Institute of Government used Scottish devolution as one of its case studies for 
ȁȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȂǯȱThe Calman Commission (2009) 
outlines a similar analysis. ȱ ȁȱ  ¢ȱ ried to merchandise 
devolution as a political suȂȱǻȱŘŖŖşǱȱŚŘǼǯȱThe UK Government refers to 
ȱȱȱȁȱȱȱȱȂȱǻȱ	ȱŘŖŖşǱȱ
3) 
The Scottish Conservative leader refers to the devolution settlement as part of 
ȁȱ Ȃȱ ǻ ȱ ȱ ratism was not); and the 
Liberal Democrat leader suggests the Scottish public are committed to having 
a strong Parliament within the UK. The SNP Government have referred to 
ȁȱȱȱȱȱȂ (MacLeod 2009). According to opinion 
polls, the Scottish public would appear to think along similar lines. Indeed, 
ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱ ȱ
pollsters have simply stopped asking the Scottish public if they want to revert 
to the pre-1999 settlement. In polls this option has attracted less than 10% 
since 2006 (see table 1). By contrast, devolution of powers to the Scottish 
Parliament has proved consistently popular in opinion polls. As table 1 above 
highlights devolution when set against independence or the pre-1999 
arrangements, remains the most popular option. In short there has developed 
a degree of consensus amongst all parties and the public that Scottish 
devolution has been a success in constitutional terms. Such is its popularity 
all parties are agreed it should be a process rather than an event. Amongst 
Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ 
¢ȱ ȱ ȱ no 
constitutional conservatives Ȯ all believe in some adjustment to the existing 
settlement.  
Whilst there is convergence over the success of devolution, there still remains 
ȱȱȂȱȱǯȱȱUK and Scottish pro-
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Unionists favour strengthening and rolling forward devolution (albeit in an 
incremental conservative fashion) while the anti-Unionists see devolution as 
providing limited short-term success, but harbouring the long-term risk of 
failure, because the UK and Scottish self-determinism are ultimately 
incompatible 
To date, assessments of the 'success', or otherwise, of Scottish devolution have 
been framed and shaped by these competing political perspectives, and 
devoid of systematic criteria for assessment. The time is now ripe for a more 
considered assessment. This article aims to assess the 'success' (or otherwise) 
of the Scottish devolution project. It does so in a way that not only uses 
common assessment criteria, but which helps capture competing 
constitutional perspectives on the issue. It utilises and adapts recent work on 
the complex nature of policy success (McConnell, 2010a, 2010b; Marsh and 
McConnell 2010) to help frame and guide the analysis. It accepts that, like 
most policies, ȱ ȁǻǼȱ  ȱ  ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱǻȱŘŖŗŖǱȱŘŘŜǼ.   
The paper introduces a new systematic assessment conceptual framework to 
evaluate Scottish devolution. In doing so it draws from various strands of 
literature including public policy, constitutional and territorial politics. We 
 ȱ £ȱ Ȃȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ǰȱ
programmatic and political success. Process measures emphasise the 
democratic and policymaking channels through which the policy is funnelled 
and whether the policy successfully navigates itself through these channels 
securing support and legitimacy. Programmatic success refers more directly 
to the linkage between policy objectives and outcomes. Political success 
ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ
popularity and chances of re-election.  
It is, of course, difficult to be categorical when assessing the extent of success 
of an existing and on-going policy. ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȁȱ
ȱȱȱ ¢ǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŝǱȱŗřřǼǯȱ
We are essentially examining a moving target - as Stolz argues:  
 
Analysing the newly established structures is a bit like trying to capture 
a constantly moving object in a photograph. The resulting images might 
be blurred, out of focus and perhaps disengaged, as they are taken from 
various awkward angles. (2009: 8)  
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Even if a policy at a particular point is judged a success, that success may be 
temporal and transient.   The analysis in this paper views devolution from the 
angles of process, policy and politics seeking to directly address the question 
of its success. In doing so, it will allow us to make more sense of the current 
constitutional settlement, its trajectory and the policymaking processes and 
politics that surround it. It is important to emphasise the focus is on the 
constitutional aspects of devolution Ȯ its impact on public policy outputs is 
discussed elsewhere (McGarvey and McConnell 2012).  
 
DEVOLUTION 
 
Devolution was part of a post 1997 agenda setting pathway of constitutional 
policy programmes that went a long way to defining (particularly in its early 
years) the approach of the Blair Government. The programmatic part of 
Scottish devolution assisted the electoral prospects and reputation of the Blair 
Government, focused and tackled the problem of the perceived democratic 
deficit in Scotland and acted as an early indication of the Blair Government 
non-conservative approach to the UK constitution.  
The UK political system pre-devolution had a concentration of political and 
economic power in London. Viewed from London, the politics of Scotland 
were peripheral and parochial in comparison to the high politics of economic, 
foreign, security and defence policy. It was in the interest of those at the 
centre to ensure the periphery was largely self-governing. As John notes:  
The duality of the system was a source of stability as both sides sought 
an accommodation with each other and because the centre did not have 
the willingness or the ability to impose uniform rules. A differentiated 
pattern of governance emerged, which was administered in a flexible 
manner based on adaptation to local circumstances. (John 2008: 4) 
ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ ȱ ȱ
Ȃǯȱ 
In Scotland, devolution was instigated for both positive and negative reasons. 
ȱ ȁȱ Ȃȱ ȱ d on the rejection of Thatcherism 
(Mitchell 1999: 33). It would prevent the imposition of policies from UK 
Government for which there was no popular support in Scotland (Mitchell 
and Bradbury 2004: 329). It would reform executive government in Scotland 
with the then Scottish Office widely perceived to be unresponsive to a distinct 
Scottish agenda. This would have, and has, prevented unpopular policies 
such as the poll tax, tuition fees and foundation hospitals from being 
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implemented in Scotland. As Mitchell ȱ¢ȱǰȱȱȱȁȱ
residual distrust of the market and trust in the public provision of welfare 
Ȃȱin Scotland (2004: 331). The suggestion is that the Scottish electorate 
is slightly more left of centre, though the evidence for this is not conclusive 
(see McGarvey and Cairney 2008: 85-6; McGarvey and McConnell 2012). More 
positively devolution was projected as an opportunity to tailor Scottish public 
policy processes and outputs to reflect Scottish preferences and conditions.  
Keating (2010: 15-16) sums up devolution as a response to a set of inter-
related questions:  
x The democratic deficit Ȯ Scotland was ruled for eighteen years by 
a party with minority (and declining) status in Scotland.  
x A rescaling of government and policy issues which was 
impacting on all states in Europe.  
x The search for new forms of politics beyond those of 
Westminster.  
x The breakdown of the existing model of territorial management 
in the UK allowed expression to an aspiration for more 
governing autonomy in Scotland.  
Overall Scottish devolution is now firmly implanted as part of the 
institutional framework of the UK political system. It has allowed Scotland to 
develop its own autonomous framework of governance. One could suggest, 
for this reason alone, it has been a success. However, we would like to 
evaluate the policy in a more systematic fashion.  
DEVELOPING CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING THE 'SUCCESS ' OF 
SCOTTISH DEVOLUTION 
Assessing the 'success' or otherwise' of policies, programmes and reforms is 
notoriously complex and contested.  A considerable amount of policy and 
policy-related literature tackles the issue from a variety of angles. It includes 
public value (Rhodes, and Wanna, 2009; Benington and Moore, 2010;), policy 
evaluation (Taylor and Balloch 2005; Bovens et al. 2006; Vaessen and Leeuw, 
2010) and political rationality (de Mesquita et al. 2003; Hindmoor 2006. Yet 
until recent work on the nature of 'policy success' (McConnell, 2010a, 2010b; 
Marsh and McConnell, 2010) criteria for assessment were remarkably ad hoc, 
and many thorny issues were marginalised or even ignored The latter 
includes issues such as multiple and often competing benchmarks for success, 
levels of significance attached to shortfalls, success from whose perspective, 
variations and conflicts between outcomes (such as short-term success but 
long-term failure). In some respects, many of these issues can never be 
resolved. As Fischer (2003, p. 111) argues, writing within the interpretative 
tradition, no amount of tested and verifiable data will convince someone 
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opposed to travelling in the policy direction that the data implies. Yet it is 
possible to accommodate many such issues into a broader assessment of 
'success' (rather than ignoring them) in order to get some sense of the policy 
and political tensions that surround reforms. 
 
Here, we adapt recent work on the nature of policy success (McConnell 2010a, 
2010b) in order to identify three sets of criteria that we can use to assess 
Scottish devolution, while accommodating competing Unionist and non-
Unionist perspectives. These criteria can overlap and indeed compete (as we 
will see) but have analytical purchase if we treat them separately for the 
moment in order to guide the analysis. 
Our intention is not to impose some narrow technical criteria by which all 
public policy processes and success can be evaluated. It is recognised that 
politics by its very nature can be chaotic, partisan and not lead to particularly 
rational outcomes. The problem with much public policy theorising is that it 
often neglects or downplays the real politick surrounding the processes of 
public policymaking (McConnell 2010: 220).  For example, the policy cycle (or 
stages) heuristic in outlining a picture of policymaking involving discrete 
stages has a tendency to underplay the politics surrounding public policy 
processes. In a similar vein, while rational choice theory has undoubtedly 
contributed to our understanding of public policy processes, its discussion of 
decision-makers preference ranking in order to achieve a particular outcome 
ignores the fact that politicians often have many processes, programmes and 
political goals that they need to juggle (McConnell 2010: 223).  
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
interpretations. Governments might achieve goals, but not everyone would 
ȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȧȱ ȱ
ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ǻȱ ŘŖŗŖǱȱ ŘŘśǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
processes of policymaking and politics are entwined but not always the same. 
For example, good politics but bad policy is a common phrase in Ȃ 
circles Ȯ it refers to successful politics but unsuccessful programmes 
(McConnell 2010: 227). Policy programmes are not always simple technical 
exercises with bundles of instruments to regulate, allocate, redistribute and so 
on. They also have a range of symbolic impacts such as leadership strength, 
decisiveness, legitimacy, determination and the like.  
Our suggestion is that to get a better handle on the political and policymaking 
environment, a useful conceptual device is to conceive of policymakers 
striving to achieve various combinations of process, programme and political 
success, making trade offs between them while juggling feasibilities and risks 
(McConnell 2010: 234). Reviewing the success of any policy requires an 
exploration beyond the narrow techniques and assumptions of accountants 
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and economists. In the early years of policy analysis there was unwarranted 
faith in scientific rationality, and a lack of acknowledgement of the political 
realities of policymaking. Attention to political expectations and the 
intractable external world of policymaking are required for a rounded 
analysis of any policy. It requires a perspective that is broader than narrow 
economic and efficiency concerns and embraces and accounts for the wider 
political dynamics of policymaking. Moving beyond narrow technical 
analysis of public policy success will result in analysis of political factors and 
other variables. This will make such studies more useful to policymakers.  
In the main, Scottish devolution has and in all likelihood will develop on the 
basis of developments in Scotland (though one cannot rule out ȁȱEnglish 
Ȃȱ having an impact). Our analysis, although incorporating the UK 
unionist perspective is, in the main, focused on Scotland. It can be quite 
difficult to evaluate Scottish devolution from a UK perspective given that:  
The continuing difficulty of devolution that there is no coherent 
approach at the centre, with no one who thinks about devolution in the 
round and no one to give strategic vision. (Hazell 2007: 19)  
We proceed by demarcating three discrete aspects of potential public policy 
success: processes, policies and politics.  
Success and Processes 
Processes are central concerns of public policy scholars. The dimension of 
policy is an important and neglected feature of policy success (Marsh and 
McConnell 2010). They refer broadly to the ways in which problems are 
defined, options are examined, consultations conducted, decisions are taken, 
implemented and then evaluated. As scholars have shown, from Lindblom 
(1977) and Wildavsky (1987) through to Fischer (2009) and Howlett, (2010) 
processes are not mere technical procedures. They relate directly to issue of 
power, influence and indeed the long-term viability of political systems. 
In liberal democracies, policy processes need to be constitutionally legitimate 
and attract strong civic support (or at least, no significant opposition), 
otherwise they are vulnerable to potentially damaging attack from those 
unprepared to accept what they perceive as unconstitutional policies or 
governing without consent (Wallner, 2008). Processes also need to be capable 
of producing legislative and extra-legislative coalitions for the purposes of 
introducing new policies/laws (Tsebelis 2002). Governments with no real 
policy/legislative capacity are unlikely to survive for long. In liberal 
democracies, processes also need mechanisms of accountability to ensure (or 
at least maintain the impression of) a strong measure of responsiveness 
(Dowdle, 2006). Finally, reforms to processes can certainly be aided when 
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they symbolise modernisation and innovation (Considine et al. 2009), such as 
new means of engaging stakeholders in policy formation. Of course, 
progressiveness may be counter-framed as 'untried' and 'risky', but 
nevertheless reforms promoted as 'modernisation', are often considered 
successful', precisely because they are 'new'. 
On the basis of the foregoing, four criteria can be identified for 'process 
success'. They may be used to assess debates surrounding the success of 
otherwise of major constitutional reform. They are the extent to which 
reforms: 
x Are legitimate in constitutional and civic terms. 
x Can produce legislative coalitions capable of building policies and 
making laws. 
x Enshrine mechanism of accountability in line with original aims. 
x Symbolise modernisation and innovation. 
Legitimacy 
As evidenced by the 1997 Referendum success, devolution was a popular 
policy in Scotland. Devolution is a process success in that it solved the 
problem of political legitimacy for Government in Scotland. It was accepted 
by all three camps (UK and Scottish unionist and non-unionist) that the UK 
Government suffered from a democratic or legitimacy deficit in Scotland, and 
it is widely accepted that the creation of the Scottish Parliament has resolved 
it (Mitchell 2005: 33; McGarvey and Cairney 2008: 108). Changing the policy 
process was deemed necessary by all ȱȱȂȱȱȱ
priorities were reflected in its policies and the imposition of unpopular 
policies by a UK Government (lacking in Scottish support) such as the poll tax 
could be avoided.  
The process of establishing the Scottish Parliament resulted in widespread 
stakeholder support (and thus legitimacy). The Scottish Constitutional 
Convention (1989 Ȯ 1995) in bringing together a wide range of interests in 
Scottish civic society developed the bones of the model of devolution 
subsequently introduced. It essentially brought together many of the 
institutional actors in what we have labelled the Scottish unionist camp. Out-
with the Conservative Party in Scotland these proposals attracted almost 
universal approval and acceptance in Scottish civic society and amongst 
opposition political parties, as evidenced by the Labour, Nationalist and 
Liberal Democrat parties campaigning side-by-side during the 1997 
Referendum Campaign. This was an important point (and a watershed in 
Scottish political history) Ȯ when the nationalists campaigned alongside the 
unionists. It was the first glimpse of the side-lining of hard-line non-devolved 
unionism from the mainstream of Scottish politics. The mainstream UK 
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ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ  ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
position on which there is consensus now among all UK unionist parties.  
An important UK intervention was the insertion of a two-question 
referendum as a necessary hurdle before legislation could be introduced. This 
was introduced with important political considerations in mind. Firstly, a 
clear vote in favour of devolution would facilitate the smooth passage of the 
legislation through Parliament. A key lesson from the late 1970s was that it 
was problematic to introduce the legislation prior to a referendum. Secondly, 
a question on giving the Parliament tax-raising powers was important during 
the 1997 General Election campaign to negate the Scottish Conservative 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ ¡Ȃȱ ǻ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ
effective in 1992). The processing of the legislation (after the successful 
referendum) proved to be remarkably speedy and smooth, with very little 
opposition.  
In the oft-cited phrase, ȁdevolution is a process rather than an eventȂ. It is a 
process that all three camps have positively signed up to. A striking feature of 
the contemporary constitutional debate in the UK is that no one, beyond the 
political margins, questions the legitimacy of Scottish independence emerging 
ȱȂȱend product. The process of devolution has in a sense further 
legitimised the independence option and given the SNP a platform to 
campaign for it. Underlining the constitutional pragmatism in the UK even 
hard-line unionists Thatcher (1993) and Major (1993) both acknowledged (in 
the pre-devolution period) that Scotland could not be kept in the union 
against its will (Keating 2009: 110). Devolution has not only been successful 
from a UK and Scottish unionist perspective in restoring legitimacy to 
Ȃȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ 
legitimating their ultimate aim in the eyes of both the Scottish people and the 
UK political elite.  
Legislative coalitions  
Scottish devolution introduced a new electoral and political process that 
involved the multi-member proportional electoral system which is a hybrid of 
single member plurality and a regional list proportional electoral system. The 
system was designed to sure it would be very difficult for a single party to 
assume control of Parliament with List seats compensating for the non-
proportionality of list seats gained.  
There have now been three types of governing arrangement: coalition, 
minority and majority government. However, in each case the 
administrations have proved adept at governing by passing laws and 
developing policy. Indeed a striking feature of devolution has been both its 
internal and external stability. First Ministers may have come and gone but 
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every administration has lasted its full four-year term. Both unionist and 
nationalist camps have governed Scotland and created stable executive 
administrations.  
Labour in government 1999-2007 (together with the Liberal Democrats) 
practised a transitional, conservative and unambitious form of devolved 
government. The concentration was on managing devolved affairs and not 
rocking the boat with Westminster. Stability - rather than vision and strategic 
direction - was the most apparent feature of Scottish governance.  

 ǰȱȱȂȱȱȱȱŘŖŖŝȱȱŘŖŗŗȱȱȱȱȱ
of Scottish politics and the terms of the constitutional debate. According to 
the 2007 Election Study, the SNP won because it convinced a sufficient 
ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ
more positive and Scottish-ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃ (Johns et al 2009: 
229). The SNP in Government since 2007 has practised a subtle form of 
nationalism, which has less to do with the pursuit of outright statehood and 
more about expressing Scottish interests and distinctiveness within the union, 
while seeking to maximise the devolved powers of a Scottish Parliament. The 
ȁȱ Ȃȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ
towards a new direction.  
Enshrine mechanisms of accountability 
Despite rhetorical claims, Scottish devolution has not produced nor was it 
part of any UK unionist comprehensive constitutional vision.  The UK, 
although having a unitary constitutional authority, is an explicitly 
multinational state Ȯ there has always been a large degree of diversity across 
the various national civil societies (Brown and McLeish 2007: 137). There 
remains a gap (and it is widening rather than narrowing) between 
constitutional understandings in Scotland and Westminster. In Scotland 
popular rather than parliamentary sovereignty is emphasised. Scotland is 
viewed as a partner within the union with the capacity to negotiate its 
position, while at Westminster devolution is merely decentralization within a 
unitary state (Keating 2009: 125). This of course is rather problematic, as the 
British constitution tends to rely on ȁȱ¡ȱȱȂǰȱ
ȱȱȁȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻ	ȱȱȱŗşŞŞǱȱŝǼǯȱ 
ȱȱȂȱpurpose was not merely to legitimise and determine 
the composition of the Scottish Government, it was also to scrutinise and hold 
ȱ ȱǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȂȱ
democratic and legitimacy deficit associated with the Scottish Office run 
Conservative years (1979-1997). The executive governance of Scotland is now 
directly accountable to the people of Scotland through its elected Parliament. 
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For both Scottish devolutionists and nationalists this gives expression to 
Scottish notions of popular sovereignty (to be contrasted with the traditional 
UK unionist recourse to parliamentary sovereignty). Whilst recognising the 
empirical reality of interdependence between the UK and Scottish 
Governments, devolution has undoubtedly enshrined more clear-cut and less 
convoluted lines of accountability with the latter more directly accountable to 
the Scottish people.  
The standing orders of the Parliament placed much emphasis on an enhanced 
role of its committees. They combine the select and standing committee roles. 
In the words of John McAllion, the ȱ  ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȁǰȱ
principled and non-partisan.... political idealism made fȱ ȱ Ȃȱ
(McAllion 1999)ǯȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȁȱȂǰȱȱ
turnover of members, inadequate resourcing and a lack of political will on the 
part of some members have meant that committees have not quite lived up to 
these high and unrealistic expectations.  
Symbolize modernisation and innovation 
As noted above, the Parliament and the devolution settlement was a key 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ 	Ȃȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
constitutional reform programme. The new Parliament Building Project (few 
would make any claim of public policy success for this) was in architecture 
and design and to be symbolic of a new modern Scotland. However, it was 
more the substance of politics which was to project modernization and 
innovation. The fanfare that preceded devolution was dominated by talk of a 
 ȱ ǰȱ  ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ  ǯȱ ȱȱ ǰȱ ȁ 
implicit assumption amongst home rulers was that new institutions would 
create new procedures which would break Scotland free of old-style, elitist, 
ȱȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖŖǱȱŜŖśǼǯȱHome 
rule campaigners in Scotland emphasised an alternative view of democracy 
and different view of the citizen than that which tends to inform UK politics.  
This was based on the experience of an extended period of pluralistic policy 
deliberation. The Scottish Constitutional Convention (SCC) established in 
1987 was a deliberative body designed to foster and popularize the idea of 
Scottish home rule. It included the Labour and Liberal Democrat parties as 
well as an extensive cross section of Scottish civic society including trade 
union, reliǰȱ ȱǰȱ Ȃȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱ ȱ
final report in 1995 is widely viewed as the starting point and basis for the 
Scotland Bill introduced in 1997. The experience of both the SCC and the 
subsequent referendum (where the SNP joined the Labour and Liberal 
Democrats in campaigning together) probably goes some way to 
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understanding the unrealistic expectations of a new more consensual style of 
politics emerging post-devolution. 
When set against ideals associated with the Home Rule movement pre-1999 
Scottish devolution does not appear a success. In the field of democracy and 
widening participation for example, home rule campaigners engineered a 
ridiculously high level of expectation in the run of to devolution. Rhetoric 
£ȱȁ ȱȂǰȱȁȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ¢Ȃǰȱȁȱ
Ȃǰ ȁȱ ȱ ȱ  Ȃǰȱ ¢ȱ ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
contributed towards this. Notions of revitalized participatory and deliberative 
democracy have not been realised. As Trench notes, ȁȱ ȱ ȱ
succeeded Ȯ or not yet succeeded Ȯ ȱȱȱ ȱȂȱ
(Trench 2004: 3). However, as Mitchell observesǰȱ ȁȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȁ ȱȂȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȂȱ(Mitchell 
2010: 86).  
Having said that, a lot of the rhetoric surrounding this period was idealistic 
with the Westminster caricatured as negative, partisan dominated and 
ineffective bogeyman and the new Scottish Parliament as some sort of ȁȱ
singing, all dancingȂ model of constructive consensual politics alternative. 
Scottish politics was never going to become a model of rational, participative, 
deliberative politics with opposing ideas cast aside in pursuit and rational 
and consensual outcomes. Judged against some of the more bombastic 
rhetoric regarding devolution as a cure for democratic ills it has been a 
miserable failure. However, to judge devolution against the ridiculously high 
and unrealistic expectations of home rule campaigners would be unfair - no 
ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
ideal.  
The two most heralded innovations (at least in the early years of devolution) 
were the public petitions system and the introduction of a Scottish Civic 
Forum. The former is still in existence and does provide a gateway for 
individuals and groups seeking to influence the parliamentary agenda 
however it would be difficult to make a case for saying is impact on 
policymaking has been anything other than minimal. The latter is no longer in 
existence with its funding withdrawn after seven years. It is fair to say, the 
impact of new participatory mechanisms such as the civic assembly and the 
petitions committees has been more symbolic than real. Devolution has not 
solved disenchantment with political institutions; political parties remain in 
decline (although the SNP have enjoyed something of a membership revival 
post devolution Ȯ see Mitchell et al 2011: 42). Democracy post-devolution is 
still reflective of the old style of politics as much as the new. 
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The Scottish Parliament - for all the rhetoric of new politics - is essentially 
rooted to a Westminster inspired model of democracy Ȯ ȁthe devolved 
institutions exhibit the pull of their genealogical roots. In part this may reflect 
the failure to break properly with the WestminȱǯȂȱǻȱŘŖŗŖǱȱŞŝǼ. 
The emphasis is on accountable and representative executive government. 
The powers of the Scottish Parliament essentially mirror the devolved 
administrative competencies of the old Scottish Office; the role of the civil 
service remains largely untouched. The electoral system reflected a political 
accommodation between the pre-1999 unionist devolutionists, Scottish 
Labour Party and Scottish Liberal Democrats. As Jack McConnell, the 
previous Labour First Minister, admitted one of its purposes was to deprive 
the SNP of outright political power in Scotland (It, of course, failed to do this 
in 2011).  
In summary, Scotland has gradually over the past 5 years or so freed itself 
from the old and rather narrow and polarised debate that sees constitutional 
politics as a choice between the existing devolution settlement and outright 
independence. Indeed there is convincing evidence that the gap between 
unionism and nationalism is narrowing to such an extent that it is better to 
conceptualise a continuum of constitutional choices ranging from minimal 
adjustment (the Calman Commission proposals) to fiscal autonomy (or 
ȁȱ¡ȂȦȱȂȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱǼǯȱȱespite 
its failure to deliver on unrealistically high expectation, Scottish devolution 
has been utilised by both Scottish and UK Governments as an example of 
political innovation and modernisation (Scotland Office 1992). Both unionist 
and the non-unionist camp ȱ ȁȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ¢ȱ
political propaganda.   
Success and Policies 
The scope of what governments can do in policy making/law making terms is 
vast. They use multiple combinations of policy instruments, ranging from 
doing nothing other than leaving problems to be resolved by 
markets/families/ communities, through to varying degrees of intervention 
involving revenue raising and spending, regulation and direct public 
provision (Hood and Margetts, 2007; Howlett, 2010). Policy instruments are 
not mere technical solutions to societal problems. They mask ideological 
debates on role of the state vs. the market and have contexts ranging from the 
specific configurations of policy communities, through to matters of economic 
affordability. 
Over the past 40 years or so, policy scholars have come to realise that from the 
perspective of governments, policies need to be implemented, more or less as 
intended.  If they are not, problems can remain un-tackled and governmental 
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legitimacy can become difficult to sustain (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984l; 
Hill and Hupe, 2009). Policies also need broadly to do what they set out to do, 
from reduce costs to improve services. Of course, many policies can survive 
with some shortfalls, especially when governments focus on what has been 
achieved. Nevertheless, the production of desired outcomes is something that 
all governments would wish to achieve. Indeed, beyond specific outcomes 
themselves, is the issue of who benefits from these outcomes. Benefit may rest 
with target groups (such as purchasers of alcohol, smokers, or small 
businesses) although policies may also produce unexpected benefits for other 
groups. 
Based on the above, three criteria can be used for assessing the 'success' of 
otherwise of policies. They are: 
x Implementation in line with objectives. 
x Production of desired outcomes. 
x Benefit for particular groups/individuals. 
It is necessary to assess success in programmatic terms by differentiating 
between pro-Union supporters of devolution and anti-Union nationalists. 
Over the period of devolution each group have been policymakers at UK and 
Scottish levels and sought to influence both elite and public evaluations of 
Ȃȱǯȱ 
Implementation in line with objectives  
Expectations and objectives are difficult to pin down as criteria for success in 
the realm of Scottish constitutional politics. As stated above, devolution 
helped restore constitutional order, stability and political accountability by 
tackling the legitimacy deficit executive government in Scotland was 
suffering from. However, as noted above, judged against expectations 
regarding innovative democracy, devolution could not be judged as success.  
However, its implementation has been relatively smooth and it bedded down 
quickly. From a unionist perspective, it has re-legitimized the Scottish 
political system within the framework of the union with the rest of the UK. 
However, it has not in the oft-repeated (and famously ill-judged) phrase of 
former Secretary of State for Scotland, George Robertson ȁȱȱ
ȱȂǯȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ
political agenda as much as ever. Judged against this ȁuber-unionistȂ yardstick 
devolution has failed. However, few other devolutionists were making such 
optimistic predictions the basis of which is difficult to detect given that in 
other European countries with devolved parliaments, nationalist parties have 
tended to thrive rather than disappear (MacShane 2011).  
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The SNP have accepted and worked within the parameters of the existing 
devolution settlement since they secured the levers of power in 2007. Their 
ȱȱȱȁǰȱȂȱȱȱȱŗşşŝȱȱȱ
was a precursor to their gradualist pragmatic approach to devolution. They 
have utilized devolution as a first step towards a greater degree of governing 
autonomy for Scotland. 
One could argue it is only in 2007 that the full potential of devolution began 
to be realised as you had a political party free from the shackles and pressures 
for conformity of its UK ȁȱ Ȃȱ counterpart. Recognising the non-
conducive parliamentary arithmetic (it had 47 of 129 MSPs) in 2007 the SNP 
set about a strategy of popularising the constitutional debate (and 
importantly keeping it on the agenda) by establishing a national conversation 
with the Scottish people. In response the Scottish unionists (with agreement 
from UK unionist interests) set up their own Commission to examine options 
or adjustment to the existing devolution settlement. What these processes 
highlight is that devolution in Scotland is likely to be an evolutionary process. 
Its success in establishing a working model of Scottish governing autonomy is 
reflected in the fact that all ȱȂȱȱȱȱ ȱ 
to extending it.  
Production of desired outcomes 
The decision to devolve authority had minimal impact in terms of the 
authority, style and operation of wider UK Government and Parliament. It 
was relatively easily accommodated in terms of Parliamentary process as well 
as government and civil service operations. However, it is difficult to detect if 
the leadership of the UK Government thought very deeply or strategically 
about the medium to long-term impact of devolution in Scotland. The UK 
Government itself acknowledge that  
What is lacking is any one department which is clearly charged with 
taking a holistic view of the infrastructure of government across the 
United Kingdom and the constitutional and policy issues involved 
(UK Government 2009b) 
Philip Nortoǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱȁ¢ȱȱ£(d) Ȃȱ ȱ
the issue of the constitution came up. It is widely accepted that he had little 
choice but to accept Scottish devolution due to the legacy of his predecessor 
and demands from his party in Scotland (see Blair 2010). As Norton suggests:  
It has been said of Christopher Columbus that when he set sail, he did 
not know where he was going; that when he got there, he did not know 
where he was; and when he got back, he did not know where he had 
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been. ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ approach, though 
without the benefit of finding a new world. (Norton 2007: 269) 
However, if we accept that the desired outcome is a governing arrangement 
ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ (Bogdanor 2009: 94) then it remains 
successful. Even with the SNP in Government for five years, Scotland remains 
in the union.  
However, if we look at desired outcomes from a nationalist perspective, 
developments could also be viewed positively. Post 1999 Scotland has 
implemented divergent policies in areas such as university tuition fees, care 
for elderly, and Ȃȱ¢ which, while affordable in the short to medium 
term raise questions regarding feasibility within a settlement which contains 
no serious revenueȮraising powers for devolved institutions. These issues 
raise questions concerning fiscal dependence and autonomy. These are 
questions the SNP have placed on the electoral agenda since the first post-
ȱ ȱ 	ȱ ȱ ȱ ŘŖŖŗǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȁtransition from an 
administrative department and territorial lobby to a policy-making machine 
has ȱ  Ȃȱ ǻȱ ŘŖŗŖǱȱ ŘŜŗǼ, the SNP have sought to utilise the 
machinery of government to steer the course of issues into its favoured policy 
direction.  
Benefit for particular groups/individuals 
Various constitutional, procedural and policy innovations associated with 
devolution such as the new electoral system, the equal opportunities agenda 
and procedural innovations in policymaking have tended to be viewed 
favourably of various interests as well as the public in general in Scotland.  
Devolution has broadened the pool of politicians with gender equality having 
an impact (particularly in the Labour Party). Each session has had an intake of 
MPs with females accounting for roughly 35-40%, which would place the 
Scottish Parliament high on any gender representative league table. However, 
much of the evidence points towards similar characteristics in terms of class, 
ethnicity, education and age in the Scottish Parliament as the House of 
Commons. It is in no sense a microcosm of wider Scottish society and its 
members tend to be recruited from the same narrow middle class base of 
politics facilitating professions such as teachers, lecturers, lawyers and 
party/trade union researchers (see Shephard et al 2001; Keating and Cairney 
2006). 
Although often projected as progressive, politics and policy change in 
Scotland in the post-devolution period has been rather conservative. What 
progressive politics amounts to in Scotland has never been adequately 
defined. In the early period there was a lot of rhetoric about notions of social 
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justice and inclusion driving forward the agenda. A cursory review of key 
policies such as the McCrone Enquiry, personal care for the elderly, free 
prescriptions and university tuition fees would tend to suggest that the 
beneficiaries of post-devolution policymaking and fiscal redistribution have 
been the middle class of Scotland, rather than the socially excluded (see 
McGarvey and McConnell 2012).   
Success and Politics 
Policies have broader political repercussions. While we accept that 'politics' is 
a universal phenomenon that occurs across the range of human activities 
(from families to international regimes), for analytically pragmatic purposes 
here, we focus on politics as referring to the impact on governments and 
governing regimes. Clearly, therefore, policies can enhance electoral prospects 
and reputations - even if only in the short-term. A policy which damages a 
government's electoral credibility (such as the Iraq war in the UK) is hardly 
'successful' from that perspective. Policies may also make the business of 
governing more manageable, or example those policies allow an issue 
(perhaps a 'wicked issueȂ, see Head, 2008) to be kept low on the agenda via 
'placebo' policies which do more for creating the impression of tackling a 
problem than actually addressing the problem (Gustafson 1983; McConnell 
2010 ). More broadly, policies can also contribute towards the sustaining of 
government's broad ideological and policy trajectories. For example the post-
2010 Coalition Government and its spending cutbacks are compatible with a 
broader vision of less state intervention and higher personal responsibility in 
David Cameron's vision of a 'Big SocietyȂ. 
On this basis, can identify three main criteria for assessing the 'political' 
success of constitutional reforms. They are  
x Enhancing electoral prospects/ reputation of governing parties and 
leaders 
x Easing the pressures on government by making issues manageable 
x Sustaining the broad values and direction of government, particularly 
in relation to particular constitutional positions.  
Enhancing Electoral Prospects 
Devolution seems to be a remarkable policy in that it has a wide ownership in 
both the UK and Scotland and a case could be made for saying it enhanced 
the electoral prospects for the UK party that introduced it and all of 
Ȃȱȱ! For the first two terms Labour were established as 
the senior coalition partner. It has allowed the SNP to achieve elected office 
for the first time in their history, transforming from a perennially 
campaigning party to a professionalised party of government. It gave the 
 20 
Liberal Democrats the opportunity to govern (as the junior coalition partner) 
for two terms. Devolution even allowed the Scottish Conservatives to build 
up a case of parliamentarians again in Scotland after their MPs were wiped 
out in 1997. It is possible to identify devolution benefits for all of these parties.  
It was of symbolic importance in projecting an image of a Labour Party in 
Scotland (and a UK Government) as responsive to Scottish needs.  However, 
for Scottish Labour that benefit has proved short term. It has been dislodged 
ȱ Ȃȱ ȁȱ ¢Ȃȱ Ȯ ȱ ȁ Ȃȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  seats) 
every Scottish General and Parliamentary election from the 1960s until 2007. 
The party is presently conducting its own internal review into its dismal 
showing in 2011. It is difficult not tȱ ȱ  ȱ  ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ
ȱ ǰȱ ȁȱty that delivered devolution has not come to terms 
with its consequencesȂ (Brown and McLeish 2007: xvi). Its tight grip on its 
MSPs ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȁreduced the liberating potential of 
devolutionȂ (Keating 2010a: 260) between 1999 and 2007. Equating devolution 
with evolution has not come naturally for Westminster based members of the 
Scottish Labour Party.  
The SNP although disappointed with its support in 1999 and 2003 has 
gradually built up its organisation, membership base and level of 
professionalism that led to victories in 2007 and 2011 (see Mitchell et al 2011).  
Although opinion poll evidence has never consistently indicated any 
widespread majoritarian desire to break the union with the rest of the UK, the 
SNP can point to surveys ȱȁdo show a rather large measure of indifference 
(to the Union) and a belief that it will end at sometime in the future, evidence 
ȱȱȱȱȂȱǻȱŘŖŖşǱȱŗŗŚǼǯȱ 
Nationalists would also point towards the disappearance of hard-line 
unionism from both UK and Scottish political discourse post-devolution. No 
mainstream party in the UK or Scotland favours a reversal of devolution and 
the abolition ȱȱȱǯȱȂ entrenchment in Scottish 
political life is an indicator of its success. Unionism as a political doctrine has 
weakened over recent decades in Scotland (see Keating 2010b), partly 
explaining the collapse in support for the Conservatives. Keating (2009: 116) 
identifies three key reasons. First, Scottish identity has become stronger whilst 
British identity has weakened (but not disappeared). Second, the symbols of 
Britishness in state institutions, political parties, trade unions and other 
bodies have been weakened as integrating and socializing forces. Third, 
instrumental judgements regarding the value of, and need for, the union in 
terms of security, economic development and social cohesion have changed. 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱŘŖŖŜǰȱȱ
ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
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Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱȱȱ¢ȱȂȱǻ¢ȱŘŖŗŗǼǯȱ 
Making Issues Manageable 
The devolution settlements in Scotland, Wales and Ireland reflect the 
unprincipled nature of the UK constitution and the asymmetrical entity that is 
the UK Ȯ ȱ	Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ histories and 
¢ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ǯ In a way each is designed to 
manage tensions around issues of nationality and identity in Ireland, Scotland 
and Wales. The UK unionist ȁȂȱǻȱȱǼȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȁ¢Ȃǯȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ 
Despite predictions of intergovernmental conflict (particularly since the 
election of the SNP Government in 2007) intergovernmental relations between 
the UK and Scottish Governments have, in the main, been remarkably 
smooth. The fact that Scottish civil servants remain members of the UK Home 
Civil Service may be a facilitating factor here. It is civil servants behind the 
scenes administrative discussion, negotiation and agreement that take place 
under the radar smoothing the relationship. However, there have also been 
political factors at play. When the pro-devolution unionists controlled the 
Scottish Government (1999-2007) the UK and Scottish Labour Party remained 
ȁȱ Ȃȱ  ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ǻȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ǽȱ
managed by respective ministers in both Governments. Contrary to 
expectations, the SNP-Labour and SNP Ȯ Con/Lib Dem relationship has not 
been particularly fractious either.  
A key factor in the lack of intergovernmental conflict has been the on-going 
usage of the Barnett formula to determine increments and decrements to the 
Scottish block grant transferred from the Treasury. This arrangement, 
originally introduced on a temporary basis in anticipation of devolution in the 
late 1970s, survives today. It essentially de-politicises the issue of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfer and prevents highly politically charged 
¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ ȁȂȱ
(and potentially most contentious) questions of funding off the political 
Ȃȱǻ	¢ȱȱ¢ȱŘŖŖŞǱȱŗŞŗǼ. Despite being attacked by a wide 
range of politician and commentators for being unfair (e.g. McLean and 
McMillan 2003; Chapman 2007), and often criticized by both pro-and anti-
unionist camps it remains in place today principally for this reason.  
However, as noted above, whilst making the issue of Scottish identity and 
ȱ ȁȂ, devolution has changed the terms of the 
constitutional debate. In the 1980s and 1990s it was the status quo versus 
devolution (as succinctly encapsulated by the 1997 referendum), with 
independence at the margins of the debate. Today, both a return to the past 
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(i.e. pre 1999 settlement) nor the status quo are serious options in the Scottish 
constitutional debate. It has moved on, at great speed post-devolution. Every 
major political party in Scotland favours further devolution and the debate is 
regarding its extent ranging in a continuum from a modest extension of the 
¡ȱȱǻȱȱȂȱǼȱȱǯ 
What is striking is both both pro-union and the anti-unionist camp have been 
(and still are) committȱ ȱ ȁȱ ȱ  Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ǯȱ
Scottish pro-unionists are seeking a stable settlement within the UK that will 
allow them to compete effectively with the SNP in Scotland. UK unionists 
have an interest in stable relations to hold the union together. The SNP, 
lacking majority support for outright independence (as it is commonly 
understood), is seeking to channel devolution in a more autonomous 
direction 
Sustaining the broad values and direction of government 
Devolution was, of course, a key pillar of the wider reform programme of the 
Blair Government which retrospective histories are likely to pinpoint as one 
of its defining features. Ȃȱ ǻŗşşŝ-2010) programme of reform has 
contributed towards a significant democratisation of constitutional issues in 
UK politics. However, the democratisation of the constitutional issue in 
Scotland pre-ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ
programme. Since the emergence of the SNP as a credible electoral force in 
the late 1960s, constitutional issues have formed part of the mainstream 
political agenda of Scottish politics. The constitutional issue in Scotland has 
been and is dominated by issues of political party stances, parliamentary 
arithmetic and referendums. It sits alongside bread-and-butter issues such as 
ȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȂȱȱȱ
Scottish politics.  
Scottish devolution was (and is) reflective of the long-standing pragmatic 
feature of the UK constitution Ȯ flexibility. It was established as an 
instrumental public policy that served to solve a perceived political need in 
Scotland. It was a policy whose agenda setting, deliberation, formulation 
were largely confined to Scotland. It would have been very difficult for the 
ȱ	ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱ
a Scottish Parliament in Edinburgh without risking the partyȂȱ ȱ
political position in Scotland. The Scottish Constitutional Convention 
presented a dilemma for actors in government, opposition and beyond, by 
strengthening the critique of the dominant constitutional tradition in the UK 
(Marsh and Hall 2007: 2). Although part of a wider programme of UK 
constitutional change, it would be beyond logic to assert it was the assertion 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ
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ȱ Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
Party inherited.  
The concept of the UK as a unitary state is an alien one to the constitutional 
debate in Scotland. The sovereignty of Scotland is taken to lie with the 
Scottish people and any interpretation suggesting it rests in the UK 
Parliament is based around English constitutional convention and public law. 
That said, in a way ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȯ the 
territorial balance of power has been largely static since 1999. Mitchell and 
Bradbury suggest,  
One may argue that the development of devolution in its various 
settings simply echoes long standing pragmatic features of UK 
constitutional development: flexible and instrumentalist in its 
response to perceived empirical needs rather than formal and 
generative in its assertion of ideals. (2004: 345) 
We have to be careful not to get external factors Ȯ such as declining faith in 
politicians and politics Ȯ mixed up in the evaluation. There is no evidence that 
the Scottish Parliament suffers from more of this than other institutions Ȯ 
indeed Scots seem to have more faith in devolution given the numbers 
wishing to extend it (Keating 2010: 260).  
Policy Success?  
To conclude, analysis of Scottish devolution as a policy success is not simple 
and straightforward for various reasons. First, it does not conform to a 
ȁȂȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
met. Second, evaluations inevitably reflect partisan interests and values as 
regards the constitutional issue. Third, the devolutioȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ ȱ
ascribed multiple objectives by different interests Ȯ addressing the power 
imbalance in the UK political system, addressing the legitimacy/democratic 
deficit of Scottish politics, heralding a new politics which (depending on who 
you listen to) has a focus on social justice and inclusion, renewed democratic 
participation, preserving the Union and others.   
£ȱǻŘŖŖşǱȱŝǼȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȂǲȱ
it has not stifled the debate about the constitutional future of the United 
Kingdom. Social scientist should never, of course, engage in futurology and 
make concrete predictions about the future. However, there exists a 
consensus in Scotland in favour of an adjustment of the existing settlement. 
Whilst a majority of Scots may still be committed to the Union and anti-
ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȂȱ ȁ¢ǰȱ
ȱȂȱ ǻ
ȱ ŘŖŗŗǼȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ¢ȱ ȱ-devolution 
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Tory unionism, and the unionist fundamentalism still found in elements of 
the UK Conservative and Labour Parties. Much Scottish support for the union 
with the rest of the UK remains contingent rather than absolute, and 
dependent on Scottish interests being secured within the union. A greater 
degree of fiscal and governing autonomy seems inevitable, it is merely the 
extent of it that is presently being debated.  
ȱȱȱȱȱȁProcess, ¢ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ
the success of devolution. The process of making public policy usually 
involves some degree of deliberative engagement with interests which as well 
as managing or resolving controversies may solve problems as regards policy 
design. The process dimension of policymaking captures all the stages or 
ȁ¢Ȃȱȱ¢ǯȱThe policy or programme part captures the range of 
tools available in public policy. The politics of policymaking draws attention 
to the electioneering and symbolic dimensions of policymaking.  
There is a continuum of policy success that is summarised below:  
x Outright Success. A Government does what it set out, opposition is 
virtually non-existent and support is near universal. Such a policy 
would signify the attaining of legitimacy; involve extensive 
consultation with the marshalling of a suitable coalition of interests 
and the garnering on-going support. The policy may be symbolic of 
innovation and influence, enhance electoral prospects and reflect 
Government control of the policy agenda. Needless to say such policies 
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱ¢Ȃǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ
real world of politics and policymaking.  
x Resilient success. More likely though is policies that achieve what could 
ȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȱȱ
ȱȂǯȱ 
x Conflicted success. Also more likely are policies that involve what could 
be termed conflicted success. This occurs when the policy process and 
outcome may not reflect what was intended due to factors such as 
delays, shortfalls and cost overruns (the Scottish Parliament Building 
project could be cited here!). It may be that the politics surrounding 
such policies remain conflicted, in part a product of competing values.  
x Precarious success. Such policies are tinkering on the edge of failure.  
x Failure. A policy does not achieve its goals, and opposition is near 
universal.  
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It is difficult to give clinical judgement, particularly in the field of 
constitutional policy and politics. However, it is fair to say devolution is now 
institutionalised within the UK system of government; there are no longer 
debates about viability and feasibility. The process, policy and politics 
framework is designed that highlight that success and failure need not be 
mutually exclusive. We have identified three broad camps. The UK and 
Scottish unionist camps although claiming Scottish devolution as a policy 
success must worry about its vulnerability. With the devolution genie out of 
the bottle, Scotland appears to be following a unique political trajectory, 
destination unknown - though it should be noted devolution appears to have 
had minimal impact on feelings of constitutional preference according to 
opinion poll data (Cairney, forthcoming chapter 7).  The non-unionist camp 
appears to view devolution as a transient success, a process that could lead to 
an ever-looser union in the UK. Despite their electoral success in 2007 and 
2011, the election of SNP Governments has not led to rising support for 
independence.  
A point to emphasise is that judgement of policy success inevitably has to be 
post hoc. As noted above, devolution is something of a moving target and we 
are viewing it from the vantage point of 2011. An alternative (more long term) 
ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ ¡Ȃȱ ȱ
success. It is a policy that whilst gaining short and medium term approval 
might simply store up vulnerabilities for programme and political outcomes 
down the line. Devolution may contain within itself the seeds of instability, 
tending to produce a dynamic of demand for every increasing autonomy, 
whilst removing capacity for integration and public policy initiative at UK 
level.  
Whilst this paper identifies three distinct camps regards Scottish devolution. 
There are signs that devolution is narrowing the gap between them. Both the 
fundamentalist wing of the SNP and the hard-line unionists in the 
Conservative Party have been marginalised in Scottish politics today 
(Mitchell 2009: 68). The debate in 2011 is about the appropriate adjustment to 
the existing devolution settlement. Abolishing the Parliament is not a realistic 
option - the Conservatives do not want to be portrayed as anti-devolution and 
anti-Scottish. John Major has even gone as far as advocating what has been 
labelled as devolution max or independence lite in the Scottish press - 
devolve all responsibilities except foreign policy, defence and management of 
the economy and giving Scotland wider tax-raising powers (Torrance 2011).   
The SNP appear to be in the process of diluting their proposals for outright 
independence, seeking a form of independence more realistic and relevant in 
an interdependent world (MacAskill 2004).  For Hassan (2011aǼǰȱ ȁȱȂȱ
soul, its sense of utopia, is the idea of Scottish statehood, the reaffirmation of a 
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Scottish sense of the public realm, space, insȱ ȱȂǯȱ ȱ
need not be equated with the outright creation of a Scottish sovereign state, 
which in any case may not be politically viable option given public opinion. 
ȱȱǰȱȁȱȱȱȱȱȱȱon but 
ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖşǱȱŗŘŘǼǯ The SNP recognise this 
reality and appear willing to settle for less than outright independence. The 
ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ǻȱ
Government 2009) was pragmatic and open-minded about future 
constitutional options. A degree of haziness has emerged over what 
ȁȂȱȱȁȱ¡Ȃȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ
one and the same thing in the minds of SNP leaders (but notably not 
activists).  
ȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȂȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ
ǯȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ ȱ ȱȂȱ ȱȱȱ
states, and the development of the EU has been reflective of this aspiration. 
The union between Scotland and the rest of the UK has, since 1999, been more 
ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ǻȱ The 
Economist 2011). Such an arrangement is in tune with the aspirations of both 
unionist and nationalist camps Ȯ it is the extent ȱȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
issue. As Hassan argues:  
ȱȱǳȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
Unionist versus nationalism binary mentality. In Scotland, despite 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ two 
antagonistic, separate tribes at war with each other as in Northern 
Ireland. (2011b) 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
sovereignty and introduced a new form of politics and policy-making, based 
on negotiation and compȂȱ ǻȱ ŘŖŖşǱȱ ŗŘśǼǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
there is more willingness to separate the concepts of state, nation and 
sovereignty. Many nationalist movements (including the SNP) in Europe 
have increasingly questioned whether sovereignty has the same meaning as it 
used to in the modern interdependent world. The SNP talk of shared and 
fluid sovereignty with varying degrees of union and co-operation. Doctrines 
of shared and divided sovereignty exist in political and legal theory in other 
parts of Europe (Keating 2009: 123). The trend across Europe is for states to 
decentralise and Europeanise at the same time (Keating 2010: 262). Keating 
(2006) talks of:  
We are not moving to a world without states but to a complex political 
order with multiple sites of sovereignty, authority and symmetrical 
constitutional arrangements. The political order is new but at the same 
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time old, as traditions of diffused authority and shared sovereignty 
before the rise of the nation-state are rediscovered and rehabilitated.  
Keatiȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȁnot sovereignty but gaining the 
powers needed to sustain a national community and to mount a social and 
ȱȱ ȱȱ ¡ȱȱ ȱ Ȃ (Keating 2006: 9). 
He ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ stitutional past in which politics, 
culture and economic development have for political reasons been kept in 
separate compartments has inhibited its development as a mature polity 
giving birth to distinctive social relations and collective action. The SNP today 
appear to be more concerned about maximising autonomy and influence than 
garnering the trappings of sovereignty. It talks of social union, economic 
union, cultural union and constitutional union. As Keating suggests,  ȁȱ-
independent Scotland is ȱȱȱȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŖşǱȱŗŘŚǼ.  
Although often depicted as separatists seeking to move Scotland towards 
economic and political isolation, the SNP see the future of devolution 
involving an extension of Scottish freedoms and autonomy. ȱȂȱ ȱ
constitution allows invention, its empirical genius being that it can be made 
up in response to events. Building on the success of Scottish devolution, it is 
how these new aspirations are accommodated within the union that is likely 
to form the next chapter of the story of devolution.  
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